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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 715th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to extend a warm welcome to this year's participants in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, who are with us for the first time today. As you know, as part of their training, the Fellows will follow the work of our Conference in order to become acquainted with the negotiating aspects of disarmament. I am sure their exposure to the proceedings of this forum will be valuable, especially given the crucial stage reached in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I should like to wish all the Fellows a very interesting and enjoyable stay in Geneva.

As you are aware, the representative of France, Ambassador Gérard Errera, will be leaving us very soon after four and a half years as head of his delegation. I am sure you will all agree with me that the imprint made on this Conference by Ambassador Errera will be felt long after his departure. He joined this forum at a crucial time when the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention was being finalized, and his personal contribution to its conclusion is still fresh in our memories, as is his role, and that of his entire delegation, in ensuring the success of the ceremony held in Paris for the signature of the Convention. We also remember the polished and highly effective way in which Ambassador Errera steered the Conference during his presidency in January 1994, and the smooth adoption of our agenda and organization of work at the first plenary of that session. Ambassador Errera will also be remembered for the tenacity and talent with which he has upheld his Government's position and for the clarity of his presentations. His diplomatic skill, as well as his human qualities, will be missed by this Conference. I am sure I speak on behalf of all of us in wishing Ambassador Errera and his family every happiness and success for the future.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Egypt, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, Belgium, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden and France. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you most warmly on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during the final part of its 1995 session. I would like to express our appreciation for all your efforts in guiding our work through this critical phase of our deliberations. Equally I express our best wishes for success to Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, who will preside over our remaining meetings of the session starting next week. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, who made commendable and much appreciated efforts in attempting to resolve the various outstanding issues relating to the organization of our work before the conclusion of the second part of the CD session. I take this opportunity also to welcome amongst us here at the CD our new colleagues from Canada, Ambassador Mark Moher, India,

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Mrs. Arundhati Ghose, Ireland, Mrs. Anderson, and South Africa, Mr. Jacobs Selebi. I am looking forward to cooperating with them in this forum and in other forums in Geneva.

I have heard, as you said, Mr. President, that Ambassador Gérard Errera of France is going to leave Geneva soon. We regret his departure but at the same time I would like to congratulate him on his new post and wish him every success because he has left many splendid tokens of his constructive contributions to this Conference.

Towards the end of this session, I would like to present our understanding of the situation in the Conference and express our opinion about various subjects we have dealt with officially or informally, and I would like to start with the CTBT. So far we are working in the framework of only one Ad Hoc Committee, which began its work in January, and the Conference has been unable until now, the third part of its session, to resolve issues relating to the organization of its work. However, in our view, the work done so far this year in the Ad Hoc Committee and the two working groups has been quite slow, particularly as regards major issues of substance, the solution of which requires political decisions. It is certainly disturbing that, with an entire annual session of the CD devoted exclusively to CTBT negotiations, the results achieved have been fewer than we expected. We hope that this will not impede progress towards the conclusion of those negotiations and the signing of the treaty in 1996.

On this occasion we wish to welcome the recent positive announcements made by France and the United States regarding the scope of the treaty, and we hope that the comprehensive and total ban on all nuclear tests and other nuclear explosions will be endorsed by all nuclear-weapon States and all other countries, thereby allowing a consensus on this important issue. In this connection, I wish to point out that, as long as we are committed to the final aim of nuclear disarmament, in our view there is no need to conduct nuclear tests to ensure the serviceability and safety of nuclear-weapon stockpiles. This has also been confirmed by scientists. Indeed, a test-ban treaty with a scope which falls short of banning all nuclear tests and any other nuclear explosions would not be comprehensive and, therefore, would be ineffective. It therefore goes without saying that our negotiations here must result in a complete and total ban on all nuclear explosions without any exceptions for whatever purpose or of whatever yield.

With regard to verification, in our view the verification mechanism of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be structured in such a way as to provide an effective detection capability without being excessively complicated or unduly costly. We feel that agreement can be reached on such a mechanism and its component parts, and we urge all delegations to cooperate to ensure that this is done. As far as the organization is concerned, we feel that this task should ideally be assigned to an existing forum, namely IAEA, after its enlargement and adaptation. This approach would allow us to benefit from the experience so far acquired by the Agency in implementing the relevant provisions of the NPT, and would reduce the costs of verification under the CTBT.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

After the NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted the "Principles and objectives" on 11 May 1995, we expected that agreement could be reached in the CD on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. We were sorry to hear the view expressed at our last meeting on 17 August 1995 that the "time has not yet come ... for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament". This view stands in stark contradiction with what was decided at the NPT Conference, and raises questions about the true value that States seem to place on the decisions taken during that Conference, which explicitly called for "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons" (decision 1, para. 4 (c)). In this connection, we wish to repeat our firm position that what is needed today is agreement on a specific time-frame for complete nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the NPT and of the above-mentioned resolution on "Principles and objectives". Such a timetable should be subject to negotiations in the framework of the proposed ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. I also take this opportunity to welcome the statement of the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, before this Conference on 29 June 1995, in which he supported the establishment of such a committee. The same position was also expressed by the Group of 21 and other non-aligned countries. We hope that those who believe that the time has come to establish such a committee will make every effort to ensure that this committee can start its work at the beginning of our 1996 session.

The issue of banning the production of fissile material could also have been discussed this year in the committee that the Conference agreed to establish under item 2 of the CD agenda. We feel that the time available this year could have been used to narrow the significant gap that exists between the positions of delegations with regard to the scope of this ban. For our part, we see little point in a fissile material ban which would only cover future production and thereby freeze the status quo, especially as the General Assembly resolution on that subject did not specify future production of that material. For work in the field of a ban on the production of fissile material to have any real significance, the aim for which we are striving, namely the prevention of both vertical and horizontal proliferation, must imperatively be placed in a disarmament context. This dual aim cannot be achieved unless existing stockpiles of fissile material, both military and civilian, form an integral part of our negotiations, as indicated in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, which the Conference agreed to establish, and as reflected in the report of the Special Coordinator on this issue, Ambassador Gerald Shannon

With regard to the issue of security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, we deplore the fact that this issue is progressively being sidelined at the CD. States which have renounced the nuclear option have an undeniable right to receive legally binding assurances - through a multilaterally negotiated instrument - against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as explicitly stated in decision 1 on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted on 11 May 1995 at the NPT Conference. That decision stated that "further steps

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should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument" (para. 8 of the decision). There is also a gap in the NPT which we tried to cover later by negotiating either a multilateral international convention or a protocol to the NPT. Such assurances have not been forthcoming despite the declarations made by the five nuclear-weapon States and despite the adoption of Security Council resolutions 255 and 984. The nuclear-weapon States which are enthusiastically pursuing the aim of non-proliferation and at the same time defending their "right" to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against non-nuclear-weapon States are attempting to reconcile objectives which are irreconcilable.

Although several useful proposals have been made to enable us to resume our deliberations on transparency in armaments, no progress has been made on this issue during the present session. This stalemate is unfortunately due to the fact that, since the end of the 1994 CD session, some States have created a linkage between the re-establishment of certain ad hoc committees and the re-establishment of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Contrary to a view we hear all too often in and around this Council chamber, we are firmly committed to the objective of genuine and complete transparency in all types of armaments. Accordingly, we cannot accept a selective approach to this matter. If we are seriously seeking full transparency on military matters, this should apply to all types of weapons. If, however, our objective is to expose the military capabilities of some while those of others remain hidden from scrutiny, we will continue to face the same problems we have faced here at the CD in the 1993 and 1994 sessions, and therefore no progress will be achieved on this issue. I would like to reaffirm that we are seeking full transparency in conventional weapons, as well as all weapons of mass destruction, bearing in mind the evident fact that over 80 per cent of conventional weapons exports originate from the five permanent members of the Security Council.

While most issues which are important to all of us in this chamber have not received the attention they deserve this year, one aspect of the package of issues received no attention at all during the present session. This was the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space. While we assume that, after the end of the cold war, there is no longer any need for an arms race in outer space, we believe that every effort should be exerted in order to ensure that, in keeping with the proclaimed desire of the international community, outer space is demilitarized and is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. If such efforts are not made at an early date in a serious manner, the long-term consequences could be most regrettable. In such a case, we could be faced with a situation in which other States might attempt to acquire capabilities for military uses of outer space as long as no universal and legally binding commitment exists to prevent such a development. Therefore, before it is too late, negotiations should commence in order to ensure once and for all the full demilitarization of outer space and its preservation as an environment reserved exclusively for the benefit of all mankind as a common heritage.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

With regard to the issue of expansion of CD membership, no progress has been achieved despite the many efforts made to reach a consensus, in which I personally participated in my capacity as President of the CD from August 1993 to January 1994. This has resulted in frustration of the aspirations of those States wishing to participate in the work of the CD as full members. We call on all members of the CD to show maximum flexibility in order to allow a speedy resolution of this problem so that work can begin in 1996 with an enlarged and hopefully invigorated CD. Since special coordinators on expansion of the membership, review of the agenda and improved functioning of the CD could not be appointed, the CD was therefore unable to do any useful work in those fields. In this context, Mr. President, I propose that you yourself consider conducting wider consultations on the issue of expansion as well as the issues of review of the agenda and improved functioning of the Conference in order to determine whether or not progress can be achieved in those fields before the end of this session, so that the results can be reflected in the CD's report to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. This would also be useful in our work at the beginning of 1996.

The CD is a forum which is supposed to serve the interests of all and not only the interests of some. Therefore, we see no justification for depriving it of the assistance that it could receive from non-governmental organizations which are playing an active role in other forums. It is paradoxical that some States which encouraged participation by NGOs in fields such as human rights do not wish to see them play a positive role in other forums such as the Conference on Disarmament or the World Trade Organization. The CD should also reconsider the manner in which its annual report to the General Assembly is drafted, since in its current form it does not fully reflect the deliberations of this forum. It is indeed illogical that the important proposals contained in statements made by heads of State, foreign ministers, eminent personalities and heads of delegation who address this body should be disregarded in our report. Consequently, we should give serious thought to the best way in which the statements of delegations and the ideas, proposals and initiatives contained therein could be faithfully reflected in our annual report. Summary records are inadequate for this purpose.

Before concluding, allow me to say a few words on two issues of particular importance to Egypt, to Africa and to the Middle East. Firstly, Egypt is most gratified at the conclusion of the draft African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, the text of which was approved by the African summit held in Addis Ababa in June 1995. This represents a singularly important achievement in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament at the regional and international levels, within the framework of article VII of the NPT, and should serve as an example for other regions of the world where nuclear weapons continue to pose a threat to international peace and security. As I have already stated during the CD's 1994 session, Egypt has offered to host the signing ceremony for the treaty, as the initiative for the establishment of this zone came from Cairo in 1964, i.e. over 30 years ago. In this connection, I would like to acknowledge the commendable efforts undertaken by Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo, the United Nations Chief

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Expert Adviser on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, and his positive contribution to the rapid completion of the drafting process in the expert group.

Secondly, we cannot talk about nuclear-weapon-free zones without mentioning the Middle East, which regrettably remains far behind Africa in this particular field. For over 20 years Egypt has worked for the establishment of such a zone in that region, but so far to no avail. In 1990, President Hosni Mubarak also proposed a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Both initiatives were welcomed and commended by the international community, which called for their realization. We hope that the impetus of the African zone will have a positive impact on the Middle East, and we also hope that the Middle East resolution adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference will be followed up appropriately, particularly where it "calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the [NPT] as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards". To quote from the decision on Principles and objectives, "the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, should be encouraged as a matter of priority". There is only one State in the Middle East with an advanced and dubious nuclear programme as well as nuclear facilities that are not subject to the IAEA safeguards system. We therefore call on Israel once again to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. We also call on Israel to participate positively in the work of the Multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group which has formed part of the Middle East peace process since the Madrid Conference in 1991.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you not only on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference, but also - as this is the last plenary you will be presiding over - on the able way in which you guided us in our work during the past four weeks. I already had the opportunity to express my appreciation for the way in which your predecessor discharged his duties and I pledge my full support for your successor, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. I also would like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India and Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada, who recently joined us in the CD. I am looking forward to close cooperation with them in the years to come. I wish Ambassador Errera, who will be leaving us soon, all possible success in his next important assignment and I thank him for his friendship. His wit, sense of humour and iron logic will be missed.

In my intervention today I will mainly address the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. These negotiations are reaching a crucial phase. In order to allow the treaty to be concluded "not later than 1996", an undertaking of all participants to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, there should be - before the start of the 1996 CD session - a

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large measure of convergence on basic elements of the future treaty. This would allow us to focus next year on the "end-game" issues and the preparation for signature after the treaty has been presented hopefully to a resumed session of the 50th United Nations General Assembly.

Today, I would like to share with the Conference the Netherlands' views on the basic elements on which convergence this year is needed, as well as my delegation's suggestions as to what such a convergence might look like. First then, what are these basic elements on which we can build the final agreement? In answering this question, it goes without saying that I present our national views to the Conference. However, as Chairman of Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, delegations will bear with me if I start with issues within the purview of that body, and which seem to have come a little bit closer to my heart.

Early convergence on scope - that is, a large measure of agreement on what the treaty should prohibit - will be pivotal for achieving progress elsewhere in the negotiations. Throughout these negotiations, the Netherlands' position has been that a CTBT should indeed be comprehensive and prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. Thus far it is, however, not easy to detect such a straightforward prohibition in the draft scope article in the present rolling text. In the light of recent developments and declarations the prospects for progress on this fundamental provision nevertheless seem to be promising. My delegation particularly welcomes declarations by the United Kingdom, France and the United States, endorsing the Australian draft article on scope contained in document CD/NTB/WP.222.

This draft indeed has the advantage of being both straightforward and comprehensive, and I am glad to note the wide support it enjoys. At the same time it is important to bear in mind that the scope provision should be comprehensive and not be overburdened by exhaustive language. We should bear in mind the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which specifies that we negotiate an "internationally and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty". A scope article spelling out the unverifiable should not be envisaged. The future verification regime, on the other hand, should be designed in such a manner that it effectively deters possible violations.

Most progress in Working Group 2 this year has been made with respect to the draft articles on the treaty organization. I am most grateful to my Friend of the Chair, Mr. Kumar of India, and his friends. This part of the rolling text has been streamlined and is now free of redundancies. This makes it a readable text, allowing delegations now to focus on the remaining substantial issues. Apart from funding, which I will address separately later, these issues concern: the seat of the organization, the possibility of a relation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the powers and functions of the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council and the powers and functions of the Technical Secretariat. In my delegation's view, further progress can be made on all these items during the remaining part of the 1995 CD session.

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The CTBT organization should be "lean and mean". This would rule out an entirely independent organization, which would be costlier than necessary. Some form of co-location with another international organization would enhance the cost-effectiveness of the CTBT organization. In addition, given the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in the nuclear field, some expertise of that Agency might be of use to the future organization. In order to assist delegations in deciding on a relation with the Agency in Vienna, more detailed information should be obtained about the administrative and logistical services IAEA could provide for the requirements of the CTBTO, in order to demonstrate the general advantages of co-location, and any substantial contribution IAEA could make to the CTBTO's verification needs, the basic elements of which after all are now known and agreed, so as to assess the added value of co-locating the organization with IAEA compared with any other international organization.

These questions should be formulated and forwarded to IAEA by the Ad Hoc Committee before the end of the CD summer session, with a view to having them answered by mid-November of this year. This would then provide a basis for further inter-sessional work on that issue. If consensus is achieved that certain links with IAEA are desirable, the exact nature of the relationship should be included in an agreement with the Agency, to be negotiated during the PrepCom phase.

While more details about the nature of relations of the CTBT organization with IAEA are being gathered, we look forward to an elaboration by the Austrian authorities of their offer to host the organization in Vienna. A better understanding of both the links of the future organization with IAEA and the Austrian offer would enable balanced and simultaneous decision-making on the two issues.

As far as powers and functions of the organs of the organization - the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat - are concerned, any agreement on their role relating to the international monitoring system and on-site inspection should now be worked out quickly and subsequently be faithfully reflected in the rolling text on the organization. Working Groups 1 and 2 should work closely together in order to ensure that duplication of work and redundancies in the rolling text are avoided.

The issue of funding of the future treaty, and especially of the IMS, is one of the major questions facing us in our negotiations. The Netherlands welcomes the agreement reached in Working Group 1 this week that the basic principle of financing the IMS is funding through the budget of the organization, to which States parties will contribute according to the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences in membership of the States parties to the treaty. We believe this agreement will provide an excellent basis for further discussions on the more detailed financial arrangements for the IMS.

In practice, we think that States parties, if they so wish, should be reimbursed for establishing new or upgrading existing monitoring facilities.

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As far as facilities outside the territory or jurisdiction or control of States parties are concerned, we think that the organization would be primarily responsible for their establishment or upgrading if required. It should be possible, however, that States parties could take this responsibility upon themselves, with the option of reimbursement of the costs involved. In relation to the division of costs between States parties and the organization, we believe there is a need for a differentiation of ownership. The principle should be reflected that the party that pays for the establishment of facilities will have the ownership of that facility.

Since most of the capital investment for the establishment of the IMS will occur between signature and entry into force, the Netherlands sees a special need for appropriate arrangements at the PrepCom stage. We think a fund should be created to which States signatories could pay voluntary contributions, in cash or in kind through a system of contribution credit, which subsequently can be reimbursed after entry into force, in such a way that the organization will not be short of funds during its first years.

Leaving Working Group 2 and turning to verification issues, delegations are aware of the further technical work being conducted this week with the aim of defining the architecture of the international monitoring system (IMS). During the 1994 inter-sessionals basic agreement was reached on four monitoring technologies and the corresponding approximate networks. It is high time that that basic agreement is reflected in consensus on the IMS architecture and on the corresponding provisions in the rolling text. According to the Netherlands, the IMS should, in order to be able to monitor nuclear-test explosions anywhere, incorporate the following technologies and their respective facilities and stations.

As regards seismic monitoring, I would like to welcome warmly the agreement reached this week in Working Group 1, with the invaluable participation of the seismic experts, on the final number of 50 primary stations, as well as the agreement on the principle of incorporating auxiliary stations in the IMS. On the latter point, it is important that the next meeting of the GSE, on the basis of the experience gained from GSETT-3, prepare the ground for decision-making by the Ad Hoc Committee as to the exact number of auxiliary stations and their location.

Radionuclide monitoring: 75 to 100 stations, which in essence will have to monitor particulate radionuclides. Monitoring of noble gases could be included if expertise and experience is available at a sufficient number of stations.

Infrasound monitoring: 60 to 70 stations, the exact number to be decided during experimental work and subsequent evaluation of this network.

Hydroacoustic monitoring: apart from the 2 MILS stations offered by the United States, a number of 8 to 9 stations, which could be fixed cable stations near land masses and moored buoys in more remote and deeper waters.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Earlier this week we introduced a more detailed outline of our thinking on these matters in our answer to the questionnaire of the Friend of the Chair for verification, Dr. Peter Marshall.

The short answer to the question of when the IMS should be operational is: at entry into force of the CTBT. This should, however not be interpreted in such a way that the entry into force of the treaty can be taken hostage. Operational at entry into force, in the view of the Netherlands, therefore, implies that at entry into force the stations, facilities and sensors of the above-mentioned technologies function in such a way that they are able to sufficiently guarantee that the provisions of the treaty are being complied with. This approach would mean that not each and every one of the stations agreed upon has to be in place and functioning. Rather it would mean that their coverage will provide minimum deterrence against would-be violators in the initial stages of the treaty. The completion of the networks, their calibration and synergy would subsequently only enhance that deterrence, making the networks more and more reliable and evasion of detection by the IMS increasingly difficult.

More generally it should not be the intention to establish an IMS which can detect any nuclear explosion in any possible medium and scenario. This would infinitely increase the network density and thus lead to unacceptable costs.

One final point on the IMS. From the beginning, all the above-mentioned networks should have fast and reliable communications. The international data centre, foreseen as an integral part of the Technical Secretariat, therefore does have to be 100 per cent operational at entry into force.

My delegation would welcome early agreement on the principle that only States parties have the right to request an on-site inspection. Further convergence on the main building blocks of a viable on-site inspection regime seems possible within the coming weeks, notably on the following elements.

To prevent unnecessary on-site inspections, States parties should be encouraged - but not obliged - to resort to consultation and clarification in the case of ambiguous events, whereby the organization can offer its expertise and good offices or mediate.

The general rule that verification should provide adequate deterrence against violations applies also to the CTBT. This should be the guiding principle not only for the architecture and capabilities of the IMS I just mentioned, but also for on-site inspection, being an integral part of the entire verification system of the future CTBT. One of the main outstanding issues regarding OSI concerns the decision-making procedure for the launching of an on-site inspection. Since the option of an OSI should contribute to deterring possible violations of the treaty, the Netherlands believes that an on-site inspection should go ahead automatically upon request, unless there are overriding reasons not to mount an OSI. On the other hand, my delegation recognizes the need for accuracy and for limiting the costs, both financial and political,

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incurred with a full-fledged OSI. In order to balance these needs, the Netherlands is attracted by the idea of a phased on-site inspection.

As far as the first phase of an on-site inspection is concerned, it should be carried out at the request of a State party on the basis of data received from the IMS, possibly in combination with other information, unless the Executive Council decides otherwise with a two-thirds majority (a "red light" procedure).

Data obtained from so-called national technical means can be of considerable importance for detecting ambiguous events. We see merit, however, in the position of some delegations that such data should be authenticated or in some way officially recognized. Therefore, if a request for the first phase of an OSI is solely based on information other than that obtained from the IMS, there should be a positive decision from the Executive Council with a two-thirds majority that such an inspection can be carried out (a "green light" procedure). This approach, also advocated by France in the Ad Hoc Committee last week, seems to be a good compromise recognizing the different positions on data obtained from national technical means.

If during the first phase of an OSI it becomes clear that more information is needed to obtain clarity about an ambiguous event, any following phase should be decided upon by the "green light" procedure.

My delegation attaches absolute priority to reaching agreement on the above-mentioned issues before the start of the 1996 CD session. We support any inter-sessional work which could help in achieving that aim. Once again, this seems to be a bare necessity to allow conclusion of the treaty next year. In my opinion work on a Preparatory Commission, which should prepare the smooth implementation of the CTBT immediately after signature, should be initiated before the end of the summer session, possibly by appointment of a Friend of the Chair by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. There certainly remain other important issues to be resolved. I could mention the entry into force of the treaty and the composition of the Executive Council. On both, further work should be done already in 1995 to prepare for final decision-making next year.

The Conference is working full-time on the CTBT, thereby giving the negotiations the priority they deserve. That it is working on CTBT only is by default, however. The circumstances which allow us to devote all our time to the text-ban negotiations are in themselves regrettable. Right to this moment, the Conference has not been able to agree on starting any activity other than the CTBT negotiations. In this respect I would like to raise for brevity's sake only two matters which are of particular concern to my delegation. In the first place it is unfortunate that, although the Conference did agree to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, work on such a treaty could not commence because of what I would call retroactively applied linkage.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Secondly, because of the ongoing deadlock it is for the first time since a few years that the Conference is not devoting any attention to conventional arms control and disarmament. During the two years in which we discussed "transparency in armaments" in the corresponding Ad Hoc Committee, many interesting proposals were presented for confidence-building measures in the conventional sphere. Although these did not meet with consensus yet, I have already expressed on other occasions the opinion that the discussion of such proposals should be allowed more time to enable useful ideas to come to fruition.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is certainly the most notable example of a useful and practical global measure in this respect. It has demonstrated its potential for contributing to more confidence and trust, leading to greater stability, by providing transparency in global trade in important categories of conventional arms. I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to encourage all States which have not yet done so to provide their returns on arms transfers for 1994 to the Register.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the issue of enlargement of the CD. This issue is directly related to the status of the CD as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. My delegation can only echo the call made by so many other delegations that this issue deserves special and urgent attention, and repeat its position that all States that applied for membership should be admitted as full-fledged members. A new, enlarged - and therefore more representative of the world community - Conference on Disarmament would no doubt inspire new and fresh ideas about the role and work of the Conference in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, I would like to express my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and extend to you my delegation's full support and cooperation.

With regard to China's resumption of nuclear testing last week, I would like to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament the text of the statement of 17 August by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

> "The Government of the Republic of Korea deeply regrets China's nuclear test - the second test this year alone. China's nuclear test violates the spirit of mutual trust and confidence between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States that enabled the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty last May. It also goes counter to the Chairman's statement of the ASEAN Regional Forum, adopted 1 August 1995, which called for an immediate end to all nuclear testing.

(Mr. Hwang, Republic of Korea)

"We strongly hope that China's continued nuclear testing, and the recent decision by France to resume nuclear testing, will not obstruct international efforts for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We urge the Chinese Government to immediately halt all nuclear testing and demonstrate leadership in global non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts."

In addition to this statement, my delegation wishes to make clear our views on some relevant issues. We attach great importance to the recent announcements made by France and the United States through which they support, in the CTBT context, the full prohibition of any nuclear-weapons test, or any other nuclear explosions. My delegation firmly believes that this political decision will greatly contribute to the early conclusion of the CTBT and will further promote a general atmosphere of restraint, under which all nuclear-weapon States will refrain from testing before a declared deadline or the entry into force of the CTBT.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to stress once again the supreme necessity of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the reality that nuclear tests are still being conducted, the international community is looking to the CD, as never before, to expedite its negotiation process and achieve a worldwide consensus on its results. In order to meet the aspirations of the international community, it is urgent to expand the CD membership so that the decision of the CD will command indisputable support from an appropriate number of full member States participating in its negotiations. My delegation sincerely hopes that the present members of the CD will exert their utmost efforts to settle this problem at the earliest possible date.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, please allow me to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, a representative of Mongolia - a country with which Indonesia enjoys excellent relations - presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed it would be a challenging task for you to chair our deliberations at this particular juncture, in which some pressing issues pertaining to the organizational work of the Conference need to be urgently resolved. I am however confident that under your leadership progress will be made towards the settlement of these pending issues. Let me pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation in helping you to discharge these demanding duties. At the same time, I should also like to thank sincerely your predecessor, Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico, for the excellent manner with which he conducted our previous work. It would be less than candid if I do not also seize this occasion to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada and Ambassador J.S. Selebi of South Africa, who have recently joined us in the Conference. I firmly believe that their

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participation in this august body would significantly contribute to the attainment of the Conference's objectives to which we all aspire.

Upon instruction of my Government, I would like to address the decision of the United States Administration regarding the scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), as contained in the statement of President Bill Clinton delivered on 11 August 1995. In this regard, my delegation would like to warmly welcome the reaffirmation of President Clinton to bring the negotiations on the treaty to an end as soon as possible and for that purpose to accept a true zero-yield CTBT that will ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, no matter how small it is, immediately upon entry into force of the treaty.

By the same token, my delegation also wishes to commend the statement made by the representative of France, Ambassador Errera - who will unfortunately be leaving us soon, and certainly I personally will miss him - during the previous session in which he outlined the position of the French Government on the scope of the CTBT that my delegation understood as similar to that of the United States stance. At this critical juncture of our negotiations on the CTBT there is a need more than ever before for a reaffirmation of our commitment and coherent attitude in order to accomplish the tasks bestowed upon us by the international community in an expeditious manner. Hence, my delegation would like to urge strongly all remaining nuclear-weapons States to follow these positive attitudes which will hopefully pave the way for the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. Of similar importance is the willingness of all nuclear-weapons States to exercise utmost restraint on nuclear-weapons testing. Therefore, I should like to use this opportunity to express also the Indonesian Government's profound regret at the nuclear-weapons testing conducted in our region quite recently, which in our view would have some undesirable impact on the course of the negotiations on the CTBT. My delegation therefore wishes to urge once again all nuclear-weapons States to live up to their international commitments to help ensure the materialization of the objectives agreed by all States parties to the NPT during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Together with the other ASEAN countries, comprising Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, the Indonesian national position towards nuclear-weapons testing has been consistently maintained and will remain the same in the future. It was therefore natural that the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 29 and 30 July, released a consensus joint communiqué in which the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN made a clear reference to this important subject. "The Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in promoting international peace and security. Bearing in mind the objectives of general and complete disarmament, the Foreign Ministers noted the outcome of the recent 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the NPT and attached particular importance to the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones by the year 2000. In this regard, the Foreign Ministers deplored the resumption or planned resumption of nuclear tests in the Asia-Pacific in view of the commitment of all States parties to the NPT to

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exert utmost restraint on nuclear-weapons testing and to conclude the CTBT in 1996. They also called on all nuclear-weapons States to desist from testing nuclear devices."

Lastly, speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, I would like to indicate that my delegation would, in due course, submit the relevant part of the joint communiqué of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which I consider to be of paramount importance and highly significant to the work of the Conference, touching inter alia on the issues related to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the South China Sea, and the South-East Asia Nuclear-weapons-free Zone (SEANWFZ). I would ask the secretariat to subsequently circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by complimenting you on the competent manner in which you have been conducting the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the current month. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada. We look forward to working with him closely. It is also my sad duty at this moment to express words of farewell to Ambassador Gérard Errera of France, who will soon be leaving us to assume even more important responsibilities which are, I hope, not unrelated to the goals which we are striving for in the Conference on Disarmament. Ambassador Errera has defended the policies of his great country with great dignity and integrity. I am confident that in his new environment he will be equally adroit and amiable in discharging his responsibilities.

Speaking in this Conference on 14 February 1995, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that "for over 30 years, Pakistan has advocated the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as a means of halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcomed last year's landmark decision by this Conference to mandate its Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate such a test-ban treaty."

The Conference on Disarmament has been negotiating on the comprehensive test-ban treaty for almost two years. It is only in the last few days that prospects have emerged for the conclusion of a genuine and truly comprehensive test-ban treaty.

For Pakistan, and indeed for most of the world, it was always self-evident that a nuclear test ban should be total and complete. No exceptions could be allowed - not even for explosions to check the safety and reliability of nuclear arsenals. This position was fully reflected in the statement of the Group of 21 of 30 June 1995 (CD/1329). Yet, this self-evident proposition - that a treaty must be truly comprehensive - was obviously not accepted, in letter or spirit, by most of the nuclear-weapon States. In our negotiations, there was consistent insistence on an exception

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being made for so-called "safety and reliability tests". And, it is well known that consultations were being held among the nuclear-weapon States to evolve agreement on the threshold of such "safety and reliability" tests.

Pakistan therefore welcomes the statement which was made in this Conference by Ambassador Errera on 10 August 1995 that France will accept a truly comprehensive treaty and support a prohibition of "any nuclear-weapons test or any other nuclear explosion". Pakistan also welcomes the announcement by President Clinton of the United States on 11 August 1995 that the United States "will seek a 'zero'-yield CTBT" which "would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into force".

These developments have created a positive climate for the CTBT negotiations. They would provide the required impetus for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Pakistan shares the sentiment which has been widely expressed in this Conference that we should seek the earliest possible conclusion of the CTBT in 1996.

It needs to be reiterated that, as noted in the Group of 21 statement, "the nuclear test ban ... is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD". It will be a disservice to the effectiveness of a CTBT if significant aspects of a test ban continue to be discussed and negotiated outside the framework of this body. Likewise, any unilateral measures sought to be taken outside the CD which impinge on our negotiations cannot but produce a negative effect.

We hope that agreement will be reached soon on the text for the article on "scope" of a CTBT. Such an agreement could be evolved on the basis of the formulation proposed by Australia. We shall wish to ensure however that the scope of the treaty is so defined that no exceptions or loopholes are available for the continuation of nuclear testing on any pretext.

Despite the improved prospects for agreement on the scope of the CTBT, there are a large number of issues which will require arduous and no doubt difficult negotiations, in particular the international verification regime for a CTBT. Pakistan will continue to work towards an effective, non-discriminatory and non-selective international verification system which would create equal access, rights and obligations for all parties. The international monitoring system, the procedures for on-site inspections and the use of national technical means must be evolved within the framework of these principles which are widely endorsed within the CD.

On more than one occasion, Pakistan has emphasized that to be effective, a CTBT should be "universal". The article on entry into force will need to be formulated to require the participation in the treaty of all those States which have the established capability to conduct nuclear tests or other nuclear explosions.

Similarly, the CTBT's survivability and permanence should be built on solid foundations. We are glad that the so-called 10-year opt-out clause

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has been given up. But, the treaty should not provide parties with the opportunity for an easy exit especially if this is to be determined by necessarily subjective judgements regarding such things as the presumed safety or reliability of specific types of nuclear weapons. For its part, Pakistan has suggested an entirely objective criterion for withdrawal from the treaty, i.e. the conduct of a nuclear explosion by another State.

Discussions in the working groups relating to scope and verification have reinforced my delegation's view that the CTBT should require the permanent closure of test sites. Otherwise, the temptations to resume testing in future may become irresistible.

I would like to add a final word about what we hope a CTBT will achieve in making our world a safer place. For 30 years, Pakistan and other non-aligned and non-nuclear States have perceived a CTBT, to quote the G-21 statement again, as "an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation [which] should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament". The assertions of the nuclear-weapon States that a CTBT cannot prejudice the operational credibility and reliability of their nuclear-weapons arsenals are, I would submit, incompatible with the original objectives of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The statement made by Ambassador Errera spoke of maintaining unchanged France's nuclear doctrine. In his statement of 11 August, the President of the United States stated that "the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile".

It would appear from these and similar statements made by other nuclear States that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is alive and well, even in the post-cold-war era. The presumption that the end of the cold war has created the conditions for the conclusion of the CTBT, and other treaties which have been proposed, does not seem to be borne out by the cold realities. On the contrary, the assessment offered here last year by Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico seems to have been confirmed. He said:

> "What is occurring now with regard to nuclear testing is no different from what has been happening in the disarmament field for years: the technologically more advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or activity for the rest of the world through a multilateral treaty".

The real challenge before the Conference on Disarmament, the real challenge of the nuclear era, is to break away from this cold and unpalatable "reality". The Pakistan delegation continues to believe that the CTBT should contribute to both non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament. In this context, we deeply regret that the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to commence negotiations for all these years on the issue of nuclear

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disarmament, an issue which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. It is these weapons, almost 50,000 of them, which pose the greatest threat to world peace and security. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their opposition to taking tangible steps to promote nuclear disarmament. We ask them again to declare their commitment to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador de Icaza.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would first like to express our satisfaction at the way in which you have been guiding our work, to thank you for your efforts and to assure you of the wholehearted cooperation of my delegation.

Secondly, I wish to extend the warmest welcome to the heads of the delegations of India, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, South Africa, Ambassador Jacobs Selebi, and Canada, Ambassador Mark Moher. Likewise I wish to convey to Ambassador Errera of France our best wishes for success in his new and important mission.

Thirdly, I wish to inform the Conference that on 17 August, on being informed that a further nuclear test had been carried out, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Dr. José Angel Gurría, stated at a press conference that my Government found that development very regrettable and repeated our position on the matter, which, as representatives of the member countries in the Conference are aware, is as follows.

The conduct of nuclear tests runs counter to the spirit and indeed the letter of the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which was adopted at the Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the three months since the adoption of those principles and objectives and the undertaking entered into by the nuclear Powers to exercise the utmost restraint with respect to tests, two tests have already been carried out and another seven or eight have been announced. Even with a generous interpretation of the notion of moderation it cannot be maintained that the carrying out of series of tests is compatible with an undertaking to exercise the utmost restraint.

The conduct of nuclear tests not only contradicts the spirit and the letter of what was agreed to in New York, but also jeopardizes the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself.

The conduct of nuclear tests is not conducive to the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which all countries, including the nuclear countries, undertook to conclude in the course of 1996.

(Mr. de Icaza, Mexico)

Carrying out nuclear tests at this point in time is all the more unfortunate because the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had received encouragement from the statements made by the Governments of France and the United States in favour of a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests and all other nuclear explosions.

The Government of Mexico has already had occasion to express satisfaction at the decision announced by President Bill Clinton of the United States of America to suspend the United States programme of nuclear tests, including small-scale tests, and to support the speedy conclusion, by next year at the latest, of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In turn the Group of 21 has re-emphasized its position that the CTBT must provide for a complete ban on all nuclear tests by all States, in all environments and for all time, with no test permitted on any grounds or with any justification, including those linked to the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.

The Mexican Government calls on the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting tests of such weapons and to declare an immediate and complete moratorium. It also calls on all countries to support the proposal for a complete and total ban on nuclear testing, in order to encourage intensified negotiations leading to a treaty which can be opened for signature before the commencement of the fifty-first United Nations General Assembly in 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on the way in which you are carrying out the tasks of President of the Conference on Disarmament and express our satisfaction at seeing the work of our body in the hands of a distinguished representative of Mongolia. There can be no doubt that the important negotiations in which we are involved require the competence and skill which we know you possess. I wish you every success in the performance of your duties and can assure you of the full and total support of the Belgian delegation.

I would also like to welcome the arrival of our new colleagues in this body, Ambassadors Ghose of India, Moher of Canada and Selebi of South Africa, and say that I look forward to our cooperation, which has already begun in a very productive manner. I would also like to take this opportunity to say to our colleague and friend Gérard Errera how much I have appreciated his cooperation and his friendship during his years in Geneva. Within the CD he has displayed great negotiating abilities in sometimes very testing situations. He has always coped with skill, panache, not forgetting a note of humour. He is now leaving for a country with which I am a little familiar, to take up new responsibilities where all his qualities will be just as much required as in Geneva. I wish him every success and offer my best wishes to himself and his family.

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Belgium welcomes the important statements made here by this same representative of France, Ambassador Errera, on 10 August, as well as by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, on 17 August, in which they informed us of the henceforth unreserved support of their respective Governments for the principle of a "zero option" for the future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), which all of us here wish for. We can only welcome the statement made here last week by His Excellency Mr. Roland Smith, the Deputy Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in which he announced that the United Kingdom was lifting its reservations on the scope of the future treaty and accepted a wording which would ban all nuclear explosions. We can now glimpse with optimism the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, of whatever nature, in whatever environment and of whatever magnitude. We hope that these important statements will shortly be followed by similar statements by the two other nuclear Powers. This would reinforce the undertaking we have made to conclude the negotiations on a CTBT before the end of the next annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. However, the Belgian Government unfortunately cannot but deplore the attitude displayed by China, which is continuing its policy, without any commitment for the future or formal support for a truly complete ban in the treaty. On the contrary, if we compare the recent Chinese statements with those which have been repeated more than once before, we can only be struck by the shift in Peking's attitude: until a few weeks ago, we were told that the last tests would be taking place in 1996 at the latest, whereas now the deadline has been pushed back until the entry into force of the treaty. This is truly contrary to the spirit of our negotiations and makes the conclusion of a CTBT all the more urgent.

Since the start of the negotiations in which we are engaged, Belgium has constantly demonstrated the importance it attaches to the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) accompanied by an effective and genuinely dissuasive international verification regime. In our view the inevitable effects of the implementation of this treaty will go beyond the strictly military aspect of the use of nuclear energy. As you know, my country boasts one of the most advanced nuclear industries and one of the highest levels of research in this area in the world. We are expecting to assume a special responsibility in this respect, which leads us to envisage in the future highly productive cooperation with the future organization responsible for implementing the CTBT. We will be prepared to make our expertise available to it. If the future organization is to perform its role fully for the benefit of international peace and cooperation, we will need to have a treaty which is truly comprehensive in scope. This is why I should like to make it clear that Belgium fully supports the draft article on the scope of the future CTBT which was presented by Australia in document CD/NTB/WP.222 of 9 March 1995, a proposal which has already been supported by several other delegations.

Among the other matters which must also receive our attention, I would like to mention here the proposals presented to the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues in connection with possible links between the future organization and IAEA. Certainly, we can well understand the advantage of co-locating the future CTBT organization in Vienna with the headquarters of

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IAEA. The future organization could indeed benefit in some respects in terms of the sharing of certain logistical facilities such as buildings, secretariat services and communications links. From the budgetary point of view alone such a prospect seems to merit consideration. However, it seems to us infinitely more hazardous to go so far as to consider a merger of the Executive Council of the organization with the Board of Governors of IAEA. Such a development, we believe, would inevitably result in the absorption of the future organization by another, well-established body, whose modes of operation, procedures, purposes are all different. It seems increasingly clear to us that the expertise available in IAEA is tailored to other objectives and a priori is ill-suited to the goals that would be pursued by an organization entrusted with implementing a CTBT. The two bodies would not apply themselves to monitoring the same events; the instruments, the modes of operation, the procedures are dissimilar. We can therefore only feel great perplexity as to the justification of the proposals for their near-merger. On the other hand, what we are prepared to consider, besides the pooling of some administrative services, is selective, case-by-case cooperation, if and to the extent that this proved advantageous for the purposes pursued by a future CTBT.

This brings me to one of the central issues in our negotiations. I have in mind the essential element in the CTBT, its verification regime. I wish to inform you of Belgium's replies to the main questions posed in the paper prepared by the Chairman of the International Monitoring System Expert Group (CD/NTB/WP.225). As you know, my country attaches great importance to the definition of an effective IMS, ensuring reliable and equitable coverage of the entire planet at a cost acceptable to the States parties. The IMS must be operational when the CTBT comes into force. For this to be so, the two networks whose role is vital to ensure the detection, identification and location of the monitored events must themselves be operational - I am referring to the seismological network, necessarily comprising primary stations and auxiliary stations, and, as a complement, the hydroacoustic network, in the southern hemisphere. As for the radioactivity monitoring network, it should play only a complementary role, all the more so as it will only be able to be established progressively, after the entry into force of the treaty, to the extent that its benefits will be effectively demonstrated by experience.

After listening with the utmost care to the arguments exchanged in this room, within the working groups, noting and carefully studying the many working papers and expert reports submitted to our Conference, we continue to harbour the greatest doubts about the usefulness of including an infrasound component in the IMS. We are not yet convinced that such a development would be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the IMS, that is, ensuring a sufficient level of deterrence, offering the best possible guarantee for an acceptable financial cost. Any excess in this area would inevitably have a seriously counter-productive effect by threatening to make the entire system inoperative because of excessive cost. Our doubts are buttressed by the actual conclusions reached by the Expert Group on the IMS, which are to be found in document CD/NTB/WP.225 of 13 March 1995, featuring on page 10 (the last page) a very explicit comparative table covering the various technologies

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proposed for the IMS and their respective advantages. The experts clearly consider that infrasound would add almost no benefit, except in the case of atmospheric nuclear explosions.

With respect to radioactivity monitoring, we regard this as complementary to the allied techniques of seismology and hydroacoustics. We see it being integrated in the IMS after the entry into force of the treaty, for at least two reasons. First, the effective establishment of a radioactivity monitoring network could take years, and we cannot allow ourselves to make the whole IMS hostage to this, when the system has to be operational at the time of entry into force. We find confirmation of the fears we nurture in this respect in the very terms of the summary presented to Working Group 1 last Tuesday by the spokesman of the group of experts on radioactivity. In their assessment of the answers to Ambassador Norberg's questionnaire for a world inventory of existing resources in this area, the experts clearly indicated that only very few of these installations comply with the specifications of a future CTBT. Furthermore, they feel that adapting them to operational standards for a CTBT would be very difficult.

Secondly, the contribution of this technology to the detection and identification capabilities, while undoubtedly significant, would be truly so only in the case of atmospheric nuclear explosions, which is regarded as being the least likely scenario; and in any event its contribution in terms of location capacity is negligible. Another argument which we feel supports the idea of conditional integration in the light of lessons drawn from the actual operation of the IMS is based on financial considerations: this network would certainly be the most expensive of those developed to ensure CTBT verification. Available estimates (CD/NTB/WP.225, p. 4) fluctuate between "optimistic" and "pessimistic" assumptions, which suggest a sum of $75 million for the establishment of a network which may be considered to be "complete". However, experience teaches us that in budgetary matters one should always adopt "pessimistic" assumptions. If nevertheless, bearing in mind the considerations and reservations which I have just outlined to you, it were to prove that in practice such an investment might be truly helpful for the IMS and with a satisfactory cost-benefit ratio, we would support option 2 in system B1 as described in the report from the group of experts on radioactivity (CD/NTB/WP.171 of 23 August 1994), to wit a system for monitoring particulates aerosols alone comprising 75 stations.

We have taken note with attention of the working paper presented last Tuesday to Working Group 1 by the American delegation on monitoring of noble gases and we are obliged to them for this effort towards developing our thinking on the matter. However, I must tell you that we are not yet convinced of the vital need for this technique in the IMS. It requires other detection instruments and techniques for analysis. The options proposed in CD/NTB/WP.171 seem to us to be far too burdensome. We consider that a hydroacoustic network might be helpful in making up for shortcomings in the seismological network in the southern hemisphere. We would advocate the use of six to seven hydrophones, fixed to the sea-bed and linked to the shore by fixed cables. This would have the drawback of being far more expensive at the outset but over the long term would be a good investment because of its

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satisfactory service life and maintenance requirements. A system of moored buoys would run up against considerable problems in terms of additional costs (major maintenance difficulties, short life expectancy linked to very harsh meteorological conditions prevailing in the southern oceans). Last but not least, the seismological network should be able to include 50 operational primary stations from the moment the treaty enters into force.

We welcome the very valuable contribution which the experts have been able to make to help advance our work as a result of their recent meeting. We fully support the list which is to be attached as an annex to the protocol to the future treaty. It would be desirable to attach to the primary network an auxiliary network comprising between 100 and 150 stations in order to provide the desired identification and location capability. As you know, we attach great importance to the principle of the most effective possible synergy between the various components of the future IMS. This is why we feel we should wait for the results of the GSE session at the end of November, which in principle should enable us to have a fuller assessment of the ongoing GSETT-3 experiment. In that way we should be able to form a clearer idea of the overall architecture of the future seismological network. Any decision on this matter should be able to be taken only after the forthcoming GSE session. Similarly, since a proper principle of synergy should not allow us to take any decision on any one component of the IMS without close interrelation with the others, we feel that no decision on the possible use of radioactivity monitoring should be taken before that time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, allow me to welcome you, as the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia, to the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We greatly appreciate the efforts you are making to seek ways to resolve the organizational problems facing the Conference in its work. You can always count on cooperation from the Russian delegation. It also gives me satisfaction to note the close historical ties which exist between our two countries and to express my certainty that these friendly relations will continue to develop. I would also like to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Canada, India, Ireland and South Africa, and wish them success in their new functions. I would like to wish every success to the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Gérard Errera, who will soon be leaving his post in the Conference in order to take up new, senior and responsible duties. Ambassador Errera has made a significant contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and we shall miss his diplomatic skills and friendly cooperation.

In my brief statement today I would like to touch on a procedural aspect of the question of expanding the membership of the Conference. As we know, this problem has been under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament and in the United Nations for a long time now - more than 10 years. In resolution 49/77 B, adopted without a vote at the forty-ninth session of the

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United Nations General Assembly, the General Assembly urged our Conference "to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of 1995, in a significant expansion of its composition, which would then include at least 60 countries". The Conference cannot turn a deaf ear to this call. The lack of any movement on this issue gives rise to legitimate disappointment, not to say resentment, on the part of the international community, and is detrimental to the prestige of this forum. The Russian delegation considers that we need to be active in seeking a way out of this protracted deadlock. The States which have applied for membership in the CD have legitimate demands for equal participation in multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues; their requests should finally be officially considered and they should receive an answer. It is quite simply improper to delay consideration of these applications endlessly and not to give a clear yes or no.

The Russian delegation has frequently spoken in favour of a rapid decision on expanding the membership of the Conference. In his statement in our forum on 29 June 1995, Russian Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev, as you will recall, stressed: "The current membership of the Conference does not fully reflect the new realities. Following the end of the 'cold war' it is worth reflecting also on issues related to 'balance' in the membership of the CD, especially since all the members have what amounts to a veto."

In recent years, various attempts have been made to resolve the issue of expanding the membership of the CD. At one time consensus was taking shape on the "1 + 1 + 2" formula; later we were very close to agreement on the list proposed by the distinguished Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan; last year there were proposals for admitting States from the list in two stages, making changes in the rules of procedure of the Conference, and so on. However, none of these options led to a practical result. In this connection, the question arises of whether there is any list of candidate States which would suit everyone. Maybe we should try a different procedural approach which is not based on the search for a "package" and on attempts to make it "balanced".

Today, the Russian delegation would like to suggest such a possible procedural option for consideration by the Conference. Why, for example, at the next official plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, could its President not submit for a decision by the CD all the existing applications by States for membership of the Conference on Disarmament, one by one, in the order in which they were submitted, so that for each application a separate decision could be taken? In other words, why could we not use the well-known and straightfoward procedure which we use every year when we invite non-member States to participate in the CD's work? It seems to us that such an approach is democratic, it does not contradict either the rules of procedure of the CD or its past decisions, nor does it divide the States wishing to become members of the CD into artificial groups, into what you might call passengers on the express train and the suburban commuter train. We would ask you to consider this modest procedural proposal on the part of the Russian delegation and to take a decision on it. We would like to express

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the hope that this proposal will help the President of the Conference in his consultations with a view to achieving a rapid solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and my country. Now I give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Mr. Goosen.

Mr. GOOSEN (South Africa): Mr. President, I join with previous speakers in congratulating you on the way in which you are presiding over our work.

My delegation has asked to address the Conference in order to express the deep regret of the South African Government at the latest nuclear-test explosion conducted by the People's Republic of China at Lop Nor on 17 August 1995. My Government has issued a statement in Pretoria condemning this nuclear test. This is the second Chinese test in the three months following the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We believe that this test is another step backwards in the endeavour of the international community to ban nuclear testing.

The South African Government is disappointed at the continuation of the Chinese tests, especially in view of China's undertaking at the NPT Conference to exercise "utmost restraint" pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). As in the case with the test which was conducted on 15 May 1995, the South African Government is of the view that the Chinese test will have a negative impact on the constructive results achieved at the NPT Conference.

The South African Government has made known its strong opposition to this test to the Government of the People's Republic of China and continues to urge China to cease its nuclear-weapons testing programme so as to enhance international efforts towards non-proliferation and disarmament.

As on previous occasions, my delegation calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to honour both the letter and spirit of the Principles and Objectives, which they agreed to and helped negotiate at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, and to exercise "utmost restraint" with regard to nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mr. Ekwall.

Mr. EKWALL (Sweden): Let me at the outset, on behalf of the Swedish delegation, join others in extending our best wishes to Ambassador Errera in his new important post.

I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference that the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, made the following statement on 17 August 1995 with respect to the nuclear test carried out last week by the

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People's Republic of China: "I deeply regret that China has again conducted a nuclear test. Every new nuclear-weapon test risks disturbing the negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I urge the Chinese Government to refrain from further nuclear testing."

Mr. MADDEN (United States of America): I would like to read for the record a statement issued by the Press Secretary at the White House on 17 August after China's nuclear test on that day. Since the CD plenary on 17 August had already been adjourned before the statement was issued, I am reading the statement in this plenary.

> "Today China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in north-west China. The United States deeply regrets this action. All of the nuclear-weapon States agreed at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York in May 1995 to exercise 'utmost restraint' in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTBT in 1996. We further urge China to endorse President Clinton's recent call for a true 'zero yield' CTBT."

That concludes the text of the White House statement. I will request that it be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I had no plans to take the floor, but I think that the statement by Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation seems to be addressed to myself as next week's President. I am obliged to say at least a word or two in response. I would just like to tell him that, from the discussions conducted informally within the Conference, our President, whom I should like to thank and congratulate for a very successful term of office, myself as well as all of us here are extremely mindful of the importance of this matter of the expansion of the Conference, and I am sure that all the members of the Conference on Disarmament are aware of this situation and are determined to seek a satisfactory solution to this matter. For my part, and as President, and without prejudging the positions of the various groups within the Conference, I can assure our colleague from Russia and all the members of the international community, whether the countries on the list of the group of 23 or all the other candidates for the Conference on Disarmanent, that the President, through his prerogatives, will, as the present President has already done, not fail to attach very high priority to this matter, in order to try to find a solution which is satisfactory to everybody and which is commensurate with the expectations of the international community and the prestige of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before Ambassador Errera makes his farewell statement? I give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): I am taking the floor again to lend my support to the proposal which the Russian Federation has just made. We believe that we have been deadlocked for a long time on the question of expansion and that we cannot carry on like this and do nothing at least to try to get out of this deadlock. The proposal made by Ambassador Berdennikov has the advantage of being practical and logical, and I do not see why we could not at least try it out, and that is why I would appeal to the Chair to take up his proposal and try to organize this test, so to speak, for next week's plenary.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Today, in the statements made by a number of countries, mention has been made of the recent nuclear test conducted by China. I would like to take this opportunity to read out the statement issued by a Foreign Ministry spokesman concerning the test conducted on 17 August.

(continued in English)

> "China conducted an underground nuclear test on 17 August 1995. China has all along exercised 'utmost restraint' on nuclear testing and the tests it has conducted are extremely limited in number. China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Its possession of a small number of nuclear weapons is solely for the purpose of self-defence and poses no threat to any other country. China has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State or nuclear-weapon-free zone. Meanwhile, China strongly calls upon other nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to China's initiative by starting negotiations immediately with a view to concluding a treaty on mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons and an agreement on non-use or threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has taken an active part in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, hoping to see this treaty concluded no later than 1996. Once the treaty enters into force, China will stop nuclear tests."

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, I was greatly touched by your words addressed to me and by the friendship shown to me by the Ambassadors of Egypt, Netherlands, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, Belgium, the Russian Federation and the representative of Sweden, and since a refusal to accept praise apparently only reflects a desire to be praised twice I shall not refuse it, while continuing to regard it as quite excessive.

This plenary is the last one in which I shall be taking part. Consequently, I would like to say goodbye. I would also like to share a few thoughts with you and my other colleagues as I conclude my stay here. The first set of thoughts relates to the growing importance of multilateral diplomacy in the sphere of disarmament and security. Security is based on trust. Trust implies the existence of recognized international rules, accepted by the greatest possible number and respected. Hence the crucial

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importance we attach to the development of credible international verification regimes in disarmament treaties. In this regard, it is obvious that the Conference on Disarmament remains the irreplaceable cornerstone of the structure, and that any weakening of its role would be a detrimental step backwards. Let us bear that in mind. We all know that the Conference is going through a difficult period, during which its minor congenital defects have been compounded for some time by suspicion, squabbling and game-playing from another age. Let us clearly bear in mind the danger we will be running if the situation continues in this way. The danger is clear - it is that of a return to confrontation, and the fact that a stand-off between North and South would replace the one between East and West is not a source of reassurance. The risk is that inequalities between the strong and the weak will be maintained, because the absence of rules is nothing other than rule by the strongest.

Let us also realize how shocking it is that for so long there has been no decision on meaningful expansion of the Conference. How, as international balances change so profoundly and as the Conference on Disarmament has embarked on vital negotiations, how can we justify the fact that it is still trapped in the straightjacket of a membership list inherited from a bygone age? Who can argue against the need to include new members, many of whom have been knocking vainly at our door for many years, and whose military capabilities and strategic roles correspond to present-day realities? Let us take care not to be the object of the disapproval of the entire international community at the next United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Organization. In this context the proposal made by the Ambassdor of the Russian Federation, and the comments made by the Ambassador of Morocco, undoubtedly offer grounds for hope.

Multilateral diplomacy is also a school which teaches you modesty and democracy, one in which there is more to being understood than simply making a statement, more to being a winner than simply being powerful. Constant explanation, justification, persuasion is required. Each of us has the task of defending his or her country's interests - and security interests are among the most fundamental. The uniqueness, the attraction of our work here, but also what makes it difficult, is the fact that day in, day out we have to face other interests, just as legitimate as ours, other views of the world, just as defensible as ours, other constraints, worthy of as much respect as ours. We must also be able to understand exactly what interests are involved, to know what constraints we have to take into account. From that standpoint the lack of appropriate forums for consultation in which everyone could and should explain and clarify his or her positions and listen to others' is increasingly sorely felt by all. From that standpoint, there is a need to rethink the system of weekly Presidential consultations to allow delegations to express their views individually and freely. After all, is this not also an application of the rule of consensus? Far from being an obstacle to acceptable compromise, the consensus rule is in fact a precondition for it, because each delegation individually is forced to shoulder its responsibilities and go as far as it can in order to arrive at a satisfactory compromise. However, this does require in return that the rule should not be adulterated and that some parties should not seek to hide behind group

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positions in order to block any chance of agreement and progress. I would like to be clear: nobody is thinking of dissolving or abolishing the groups. But we should all recognize that their make-up, and thus their role and the way in which they function, date back to the past and should be reviewed.

Finally, multilateral diplomacy is the field where the role of men - and of course women - is the most important, where the course of events can be changed through individual action. My greatest pleasure over these past four and a half years will certainly have been to discover and to develop ties of lasting friendship with many colleagues. I shall miss them. This applies both to the representatives of our traditional allies, with whom we have defended common causes, and to the colleagues with whom the opposition of national interests or ideological differences, far from being detrimental to mutual respect, in fact contributed to it. I thank all of them for the friendship they have always shown me. I shall miss their intelligence, their uprightness, their humour, and for some of them, all three.

To these comments on the role of multilateral diplomacy I would add a second one which is rather more personal. I have been fortunate. The time during which I have served here has coincided with a period particularly rich in international disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. I was lucky enough to arrive in Geneva at the start of the final phase of the negotiations on the treaty to ban chemical weapons, which was concluded at the end of 1992 and signed in January 1993. I was lucky enough to be here at the time of the launching of negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to see my country contribute to moving those negotiations forward at a key moment, with the certainty that this treaty will be concluded next year and the satisfaction that France will have made an active contribution to this success. I was lucky enough to be involved in and a witness to my country's accession to the NPT and then the extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period. And finally I was lucky enough to have with me a remarkable team to whom I would like to pay a public tribute here for their exceptional qualities.

Lastly, I would like to make a comment on present-day international realities which the Conference on Disarmament necessarily depends on when setting its goals. It is a fact that we are receiving ambivalent signals from the present situation. On the one hand, positive trends: the end of the East-West confrontation; the implementation of a genuine disarmament process, conventional and nuclear; the pursuit of a peace process in the Near East, against all opposition. The consolidation of non-proliferation regimes, of which the indefinite extension of the NPT is the cornerstone; the forthcoming conclusion of a treaty for the denuclearization of Africa. On the other hand, dangerous situations, which are continuing or worsening. Some regions are still engaged in a weapons build-up. Major nuclear capabilities remain, in Europe and worldwide. Risks of proliferation remain. The end of the cold war is breeding fresh temptations for regional domination. We are thus at a crossroads.

If we want to go further, it seems to me essential to bear a few simple ideas in mind. There are three which I will mention. First, the

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international community has undertaken commitments in the field of disarmament, in particular during the NPT Extension Conference. These commitments must be kept. The nuclear Powers have a special responsibility in this regard. France will shoulder it. Second, there is a clear link between the results of efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the disarmament effort. It is difficult to see how to reconcile the pursuit of such efforts by the nuclear Powers with the maintenance of clandestine nuclear capabilities, or the development of programmes, in violation of commitments undertaken, elsewhere. Finally, it is no longer possible to say that the sole threat to peace lies in the nuclear weapons held by the "big five". Everybody knows that the accumulation of conventional weapons, and the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in regions of tension, is a real danger, primarily for the great majority of developing countries which are at the same time under pressure from powerful neighbours and suffering from restrictions on the transfer of technology which are the very result of proliferation. One day the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament will really have to reflect this situation.

So the Conference today faces a choice. Either it clings to bygone structures and quarrels from another age - and if it does, once the CTBT has been concluded, it might well lose its central role in the field of disarmament and security. Or it renews its agenda, it expands its membership; it modernizes its working methods; and then, in the eyes of the international community, it will be the essential instrument for the creation of a safer world.

General de Gaulle left us an important message which is at the heart of our foreign policy. This message is a simple one: history is not preordained; it is up to the will of men to control their destiny. For my part, I believe in the virtues of human action. It is my wish that the Conference on Disarmanent should succeed, and if we have the will to do so, it is within our reach. As I say goodbye, I would like to single out the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, and to express my feelings of friendship and gratitude to the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail, who has always been an able organizer, a cordial colleague and a good adviser. Lastly, I would like to extend my thanks to the members of the secretariat and to the interpreters.

My best wishes for personal success and personal happiness to all my colleagues. I shall miss you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As my term of office as President of this Conference comes to an end, I should like to make a few closing remarks. During my four weeks of presidency I have not spared any effort, either at the bilateral level or at the Presidential consultations, in order to bring about agreement on the remaining

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outstanding issues facing the Conference. I have also undertaken a number of consultations with members and non-members specifically on the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, and it is my sincere hope that my successor will be able to move this issue forward. My consultations were based on the invaluable work done by my predecessors, and especially by Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico. Unfortunately, despite all my efforts, I am not in a position to report to the Conference agreement on any of the pending issues for the current session. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the fact that delegtions agreed to lay the ground for a smooth and effective start to the 1996 session of the CD and begin consideration of the agenda and programme of work for 1996. I believe that my endeavours have proved to be valuable in understanding the positions and concerns of all delegations with regard to the agenda and organization of work of the Conference, bearing in mind the existing consensus that the CTBT negotiations will receive the highest priority next year. I am heartened by the fact that the CTBT negotiations have intensified due to the recent proposals which have brought us even closer to our commonly shared goal, that is, the finalization of the treaty next year. I thank all delegations, the coordinators, and of course the secretariat for their constant support and cooperation and wish Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco every success in his presidency.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 31 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.